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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN THE




The West, often portrayed as the "Great American Des-
ert" by nineteenth-century cartographers, suffers from an im-
balance between water resources and public needs. Simply
put, it has abundant land but little water. To correct this im-
balance, the western states have developed water rights sys-
tems governing the right to divert and use water. Many west-
ern states have also developed water delivery systems which
transport water from rivers, lakes and streams to distant areas
where it is needed for human use.
A new theory of water law recently has been advanced
that could potentially change the water rights systems of the
western states. This theory, still in its embryonic stage, is
based on an ancient common law doctrine-the public trust
doctrine. This doctrine provides for public control of naviga-
ble waters for the protection of certain public uses, particu-
larly navigation, commerce and fisheries. Some environmental
advocates are now suggesting that this doctrine provides a ba-
sis for challenging water rights granted under state water
rights laws. Under this argument, state-granted water rights
are invalid if they impair navigation or other public uses pro-
tected by the public trust doctrine.' This argument is being
o 1982 by Roderick E. Walston
* Deputy Attorney General, San Francisco, California, Environmental Law De-
partment. B.A., 1958, Columbia College; LL.B., 1961, Stanford University. Represents
the State of California in Nat'l Audubon Soc. v. Dept. of Water and Power of Los
Angeles, described more fully in note 2 infra and the accompanying text. The views
expressed herein belong solely to the author, and should not be attributed to the
State of California or any agency thereof.
1. This question has been generally discussed by several commentators of west-
ern water law. See R. CLARK WATERS, AND WATER RIGHTS 177-279 (1967) [herinafter
cited as Clark]; Dunning, The Significance of California's Public Trust Easement for
California's Water Rights Law, 14 U. CAL. D. L. REV. 357 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Dunning]; Johnson, Public Trust Protection for Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14
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asserted by the National Audubon Society in its attempt to
prevent the diversion of water from Mono Lake in northern
California to the distant metropolis of Los Angeles.2
This theory has far-reaching implications. It would pro-
vide a basis for protection of important environmental re-
sources, now threatened by water diversions authorized under
state water rights laws. By the same token, however, it would
jeopardize long-standing water rights by subjecting them to
constraints that formerly were not thought to exist, thus cre-
ating confusion and uncertainty about the predictability of
water supplies. The theory, by providing a new weapon in the
environmental arsenal, could produce a new balance between
environmental and economic interests in the West.
This article will analyze the public trust doctrine and
state water rights laws from historical and policy perspectives.
The focus will be on the laws developed by California, which
have frequently served as a model for other states. As shall be
seen, state water rights laws provide the exclusive basis for
determining the allocation of water among competing uses.
The public trust doctrine has no role in this context. The doc-
trine provides that the state has sovereign control of navigable
waters as against private proprietary claims, and thus retains
continuing jurisdiction over navigable waters for the protec-
tion of certain public uses. It, however, does not require the
state to protect one such use as against another. The doctrine
thus provides that the state has the right to choose among
competing uses, but does not determine what the choice
should be. That choice, as applied to water diversions and
uses, is governed solely by state water rights laws.
Since the public trust doctrine allows the state to choose
among competing uses, it provides a basis for the state to re-
tain continuing jurisdiction over water rights so that continu-
ing choices can be made. Existing state water rights laws, in-
corporating this facet of the public trust doctrine, enable the
U. CAL. D. L. REV. 233 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Johnson]; Robie, The Public In-
terest in Water Rights Administration, 23 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 917, 927 (1977);
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Inter-
vention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 473 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sax]; Schneider, Legal
Aspects of Instream Water Uses in California, Governor's Commission to Review
California Water Rights Law Staff Paper No. 6, at 6-29 (January 1978); Trelease,
Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 638 (1957).
2. See Nat'l Audubon Soc. v. Dept. of Water and Power of Los Angeles, No. 639
(Alpine County Super. Ct., Cal.).
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state to reallocate water supplies for the protection of impor-
tant public uses. Such laws accordingly have a built-in safe-
guard which protects legitimate environmental values from
threats posed by state-granted water rights. Therefore, the
public trust doctrine has a role in the water rights context,
but not the one now popularly asserted. Environmentalists
have a remedy for the protection of important environmental
values, but, again, not the one they are asserting. Their rem-
edy is not found in distant, exotic common law jungles.
Rather, it is found in statutory principles closer to home.
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
One of the dominant principles of the English common
law, at the time of the American revolution, was that naviga-
ble waters were under the exclusive control of the King.' After
the revolution, the King's control of navigable waters in the
American colonies was assumed by the original thirteen
states.4 The states, in turn, passed the right to regulate com-
merce among the states to the new federal government.' This
federal power includes an expansive right to protect the navi-
gability of navigable waters, so that these waters can serve as
highways of commerce.6 Otherwise, the original thirteen states
retained control of their navigable waters. This retained
power includes control, not only of the waters themselves, but
also of the fisheries and of the underlying beds." When new
states joined the Union, they were admitted on an "equal
footing" with the original thirteen states.8 The western states,
3. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-18 (1894); Martin v. Lessee of Wadell,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842). As the Supreme Court commented in Bowiby: "By
the common law, both the title and the dominion of the sea ... where the tide ebbs
and flows, and of all the lands below high water mark, within the jurisdiction of the
Crown of England, are in the King." 152 U.S. at 11.
4. See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. at 25-31, Manchester v. Massachusetts,
139 U.S. 240, 259-62 (1891); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229
(1848); Martin v. Lessee of Wadell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 410.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 231-33
(1960); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899); Gilman v.
Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724-25 (1866).
7. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597 (1963) (underlying beds);
Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891) (fisheries); Pollard's Lessee v. Ha-
gen, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1848) (underlying beds); Martin v. Lessee of Wadell, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842) (fisheries).
8. See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971); United States v. Texas, 339
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including California, thus acquired the same control of their
navigable waters and dependent resources as the original
states.
This brief historical glimpse describes the powers of the
states over navigable waters in our federal system and how
that power relates to other states and the federal government.
It does not, however, describe the power of the states in rela-
tion to their citizens. It describes how the states got their
power, but not how they exercise it. The latter subject is gov-
erned by the public trust doctrine, an ancient common law
doctrine providing for sovereign control of navigable waters.
Under the public trust doctrine, the state, acting on be-
half of the people, has the right to regulate, control and utilize
navigable waters for the protection of certain public uses, par-
ticularly navigation, commerce and fisheries.' The state, it is
often said, retains a dominant "easement" or "servitude" in
navigable waters for this purpose. 10 More recent cases have
held that the trust includes a broader range of public uses
than were recognized in earlier cases; it is now held that the
trust protects varied public recreational uses in navigable wa-
ters, such as the right to fish, hunt and swim.11 The trust is a
dynamic, rather than static, concept and seems destined to
expand with the development and recognition of new public
uses.
U.S. 707, 716-18 (1950); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1934); Louisiana v.
Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1, 52 (1905). In the Act admitting California to the Union, Cali-
fornia was expressly admitted on an "equal footing" with the other states. Act for the
Admission of California into the Union, ch. 50, 9 Stat. 452 (1850).
9. California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 696 (1981); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162
Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980); Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr.
790 (1971); City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr.
23 (1970); Colberg, Inc. v. California ex rel. Dept. of Pub. Works, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432
P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967); Mallon v. City of Long Beach, 44 Cal. 2d 199, 282
P.2d 481 (1955); Bohn v. Albertson, 206 Cal. 148, 273 P. 797 (1928); Gray v. Reclama-
tion Dist. No. 1500, 174 Cal. 622, 163 P. 1024 (1917); People v. California Fish Co.,
166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913); People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 66 Cal. 138, 4
P. 1152 (1884); Sax, supra note 1; Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient
Prerogative Becomes the People's Environmental Right, 14 U. Cal. D.L. REV. 195
(1980).
10. See, e.g., City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362,
162 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980); Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d at 261, 491 P.2d at 381, 98 Cal.
Rptr. at 797; People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. at 584, 138 P. at 82.
11. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d at 521, 606 P.2d at 368, 162




The public trust doctrine received its impetus from the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Central Railroad
Company v. Illinois." The Illinois legislature granted 1,000
acres of submerged lands, representing virtually the entire wa-
terfront of Chicago, to a private railroad company in fee sim-
ple. A few years later, the legislature reappraised its action
and enacted a measure to revoke the grant. The railroad com-
pany sued. The Supreme Court ruled that the grant was revo-
cable. It held that, although the state may lawfully grant indi-
vidual parcels of land for wharves, docks and other structures
to aid commerce, the state cannot grant the entire waterfront
to a private party because the state holds this property in
trust for the public. According to the Court, the state "can no
more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole peo-
ple are interested ... than it can abdicate its police powers in
the administration of government and the preservation of
peace."'"
Putting aside the broad language often appearing in pub-
lic trust cases, these cases generally fall into three separate
categories. The first category consists of cases, such as Illinois
Central, raising the question whether the state has a para-
mount interest in navigable waters over private proprietary
claims. These cases often arise in a quiet title context and
usually relate to control of tidal or submerged lands. The
cases hold, subject to various exceptions, that the state retains
sovereign control of the waters and underlying lands notwith-
standing interests granted to private parties. 14 In City of
Berkeley v. Superior Court,'6 for example, it was held that
California, in granting private interests in tidelands by legisla-
tion enacted in 1870, did not thereby surrender its control of
such tidelands; "one legislature may not sell the discretion of
its successors to exercise the state's power as the trustee of
tidelands."' Generally, the courts have held that the trust re-
12. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
13. Id. at 453.
14. See, e.g., California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625, P.2d 239,
172 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1981); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d
362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980); Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 790 (1971); City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 23 (1970).
15. 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980).
16. Id. at 531, 606 P.2d at 371, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 336. The court overruled an
earlier decision that had held that the trust was terminated by the legislative sales
1982]
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mains intact, except with respect to small parcels of land that
are used as part of a general scheme for the furtherance of
trust purposes, and where the parcels have been rendered use-
less for trust purposes.1 7 Subject to these exceptions, the gen-
eral rule is that the trust provides for paramount state control
of navigable waters as against private proprietary claims.
The second category of cases consists of those raising the
question whether a structure or activity in navigable waters
can be enjoined on grounds that it impairs navigation or other
trust purposes. The courts have consistently held that the
public trust prohibits a private party from impairing naviga-
tion or other trust purposes under these circumstances.' 8 For
instance, in People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Company,"
a miner was enjoined from depositing debris in navigable wa-
ters which, because it raised the depth of the underlying bed,
effectively impaired navigation. Thus, the trust does more
than simply provide that the state has paramount control of
navigable waters; it also provides that private water uses are
invalid if they infringe on certain public uses, such as naviga-
tion. The trust provides not only that the sovereign has power
over navigable waters, but also that this power is self-execut-
ing. In this sense, the trust functions much like a common law
nuisance doctrine.
The public trust doctrine is different from the federal
power to control navigation. In Willamette Iron Bridge v.
Hatch,2 0 the United States Supreme Court held that the fed-
eral navigation power does not, in itself, prohibit the place-
ment of obstructions in navigable waters, and that no federal
common law prohibits such obstructions. The federal naviga-
tion power does no more than equip Congress with authority
to impose its own prohibitions."' Thus, the federal navigation
program under review. Id. at 534, 606 P.2d at 373, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 338. Because the
earlier decision had been relied on by private parties, the court declined to give its
decision full retroactive effect, instead limiting the trust to those lands that had not
been filled and that were still subject to tidal action. Id.
17. See, e.g., City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 484-86, 476 P.2d 423,
438-41, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23, 38-40 (1970); Atwood v. Hammond, 4 Cal. 2d 31, 40, 48 P.2d
20, 24 (1935); People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 585, 593-94, 138 P. 79, 82,
83, 86, (1913).
18. See People v. Russ, 132 Cal. 102, 64 P. 111 (1901); People v. Gold Run
Ditch & Mining Co., 66 Cal. 138, 4 P. 1152 (1884).
19. 66 Cal. 138, 4 P. 1152 (1884).
20. 125 U.S. 1 (1888).
21. Accord, Hamilton v. Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pac. R.R., 119 U.S. 280
[Vol. 22
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power, unlike the public trust, is not self-executing. Congress
filled this void by enactment of the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899,22 which, within limits not yet wholly defined,23 provides
that the Army Corps of Engineers must approve any obstruc-
tion which affects the navigable capacity of navigable waters.2 4
To the extent that the Act does not apply, however, no federal
law prohibits obstructions in navigable waters. The federal
navigation power is a dormant constitutional principle that, in
itself, does not protect navigation interests, but only provides
a basis for congressional action. The public trust, on the other
hand, is an active common law principle which, without more,
protects the public interest in navigable waters.
The third category of public trust cases concerns the au-
thority of government, as opposed to private individuals, to
(1886); Cardwell v. American River Bridge Co., 113 U.S. 205, 208-09 (1885); Gilman v.
Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724 (1866). Federal common law applies, however,
in restraining states from polluting interstate waters to the detriment of other states,
assuming that Congress has not adopted its own restraints. See City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
In this sense, the federal navigation power, although based on the federal power
to regulate interstate commerce, has been defined differently from the latter power.
As a general rule, the federal executive branch has inherent power to prevent obstruc-
tions to interstate commerce even in the face of congressional silence. See In Re
Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895); United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 279-80,
284 (1888). Further, an action can be maintained under the commerce clause to re-
strain a state from imposing an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce even
where Congress has not authorized such an action. See, e.g., Covington & Cincinnati
Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204 (1894); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878).
Indeed, it appears that, under the English common law, the sovereign has an inherent
right to prevent obstructions and nuisances in navigable waters that prevent the free
flow of commerce. See Wisdom, Obstruction in Rivers, 119 JUST. P. 846 (1955); Note,
Substantive and Remedial Problems in Preventing Interferences with Navigation:
The Republic Steel Case, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 1065, 1074-76 (1959). Thus, the federal
navigation power, in not directly prohibiting obstructions in navigable waters, ap-
pears to be an anomalous product of the federal commerce power.
22. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-26 (1970).
23. For instance, in United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690(1899), the Supreme Court stated that whether the Act applies to a private irrigation
dam depends on "whether such appropriation substantially interferes with the navi-
gable capacity within the limits where navigation is a recognized fact." Id. at 709.
Other federal appellate decisions, however, have held that the Act broadly applies to
structures or activities that have any effect on navigable capacity. See Zabel v. Tabb,
430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971); United States v. Jo-
seph G. Moretti, Inc., 526 F.2d 1306, 1310 (5th Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court re-
cently granted certiorari to consider this question, but dismissed the action on
grounds that actions to enforce the Act can only be maintained by the federal govern-
ment, not by private parties. See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
24. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
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impair traditional purposes of the public trust, such as navi-
gation. These cases hold that the state has authority to impair
certain trust purposes, such as navigation, if the state is fulfil-
ling other trust purposes, such as commerce.15 Some early de-
cisions suggested that the public trust requires the protection
of "navigation and fishery, ' 26 which implies that the state
cannot take action which has any adverse effect on those spe-
cific values. More recent decisions, however, have held that
the state can take action which promotes "commerce" in navi-
gable waters, even at the expense of navigation itself.27 For
instance, in Colberg, Inc. v. California ex rel. Dept. of Public
Works, 5 the California Supreme Court held that the state has
the right to build a bridge over navigable waters even though
the bridge obstructs navigation. The bridge, it was held, pro-
motes commerce, whether navigational or otherwise. Simi-
larly, in Boone v. Kingsbury,29 the court held that, the state
has the right to grant licenses for exploration of gas and oil in
tidal or submerged lands although the explorations may be
harmful to navigation and fisheries. The court held that the
explorations result in the production of gas and oil which is
vital to the nation's commerce. These cases make clear that
the state can impair navigation uses in order to benefit com-
merce. Virtually any activity authorized by a state in naviga-
ble waters can be justified on grounds that it promotes com-
merce in one form or another. Therefore, the public trust
doctrine, in allowing the state to impair navigation for the
benefit of commerce, apparently places no restraints on the
state in its allocation and regulation of navigable waters.
The state's increased authority to promote commerce at
the expense of navigation is reflective of the evolving impor-
tance of those interests in our recent national history. At the
time of the American revolution much, of the nation's com-
25. Colberg, Inc. v. California ex rel. Dept. of Pub. Works, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432
P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967); Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 273 P. 797 (1928);
Gray v. Reclamation Dist. No. 1500, 174 Cal. 622, 163 P. 1024 (1917).
26. People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913); Ward v. Mul-
ford, 32 Cal. 365, 372 (1867). See Eldridge v. Cowell, 4 Cal. 80, 87 (1854).
27. See, e.g., California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 29 Cal. 3d 210, 214, 625 P.2d
239, 241, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, 698 (1981); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d
515, 521, 606 P.2d 362, 364-65, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 329-30 (1980); Marks v. Whitney, 6
Cal. 3d 251, 259, 491 P.2d 374, 379-80, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 795-96 (1971).
28. 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967).
29. 206 Cal. 148, 273 P. 797 (1928).
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merce was conducted on navigable waterways. Today, most of
the nation's commerce is conducted on public highways, in the
air and on railroad tracks. There is now less reason to insist
on inviolate navigation interests. Indeed, the states' expanded
powers over commerce under the public trust doctrine is anal-
ogous to the expansion of federal powers over commerce
under modern judicial interpretation.30 The public trust doc-
trine has been interpreted, consistently with the general mod-
ern trend, to recognize the legitimacy of expanded govern-
mental authority in the commerce arena.
To recapitulate, the public trust doctrine, as judicially in-
terpreted and applied, appears to establish three fundamental
principles with respect to public control of navigable waters.
First, as in City of Berkeley, the state retains sovereign con-
trol of navigable waters over private interests, subject to lim-
ited exceptions, for the purpose of adapting such waters to
changing public needs. The state does not divest itself of such
jurisdiction by granting certain rights in such waters to pri-
vate individuals. Second, as in Gold Run, the doctrine pro-
vides that private parties cannot make the choice between
navigation and commerce, or between development and con-
servation. The choice belongs exclusively to the state and can-
not be exercised by private individuals. Third, as in Colberg,
the doctrine provides that the state has the right to choose
between the competing values of navigation and commerce,
and that the courts will not interfere with that choice. The
state has the right to develop or conserve its water supply,
and the public trust doctrine is neutral on the choice that
should be made.
To state these principles more succinctly, the public trust
doctrine provides, as in Colberg, that the state has the right to
choose between development and conservation of its water re-
sources. Second, as in Gold Run, the choice belongs to the
state, not to private individuals. Third, as in City of Berkeley,
the state has a continuing right to make the choice. In short,
the public trust doctrine limits the extent to which private
entities can acquire interests in navigable waters, but does not
limit the state's regulatory control of such waters. It allows
30. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Contra National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976) where the Court held that the tenth amendment limits Congress,
acting under the commerce clause, in applying restraints against the states.
1982]
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the state to choose among competing public uses and pre-
serves the state's continuing right to make the choice, but
does not compel the state to make a specific substantial
choice.
As we shall see now, the western states have developed
water rights systems which provide a means for the states to
exercise their choice-reserved to them by the Colberg line of
cases-between developing and conserving their water re-
sources. Moreover, as shall be seen, these water rights systems
allow the states to retain continuing jurisdiction over the allo-
cation of their water supplies, consistent with City of Berke-
ley. Under these systems, the states have adopted a reason-
ableness test as the basis for determining the existence of
water rights, a test that requires a balancing of development
needs against conservation needs on a case-by-case basis. Im-
portantly, it is the state, in granting the water right, which
makes the choice between development and conservation; the
choice is not made by the private user, even though he exer-
cises the right. Therefore, the right is more analogous to the
rights asserted in Colberg, which held that the state had the
right to choose between navigation and commerce, than to the
rights asserted in Gold Run, where it was held that a private
user cannot make this choice.
III. THE CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS SYSTEM
Western water law in general, and California water law in
particular, has developed independently of the principles of
the public trust doctrine. Specific rules have been established
governing the right to divert and use water, and these rules, at
least on the surface, owe little to the public trust rationale.
Early western water law was governed by the riparian doc-
trine which provided that a landowner has the right to use
water appurtenant to his land, subject to the right of down-
stream landowners to the continued natural flow. 1 The ripar-
ian doctrine originated in Roman law, and was adopted as
part of the English common law. 2 It provides the basis of
31. See United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 745 (1950);
Vernon Irrig. Co. v. Los Angeles, 106 Cal. 237, 256, 39 P. 762, 768 (1895); W. HUTCH-
INS, CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 178-256 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HUTCHINS,
CALIFORNIA LAW]; S. WELL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 773-75 (3d ed.
1911) [hereinafter cited as WEIL].
32. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. at 744-45; 1 W. HUTCHINS,
[Vol. 22
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water law in most of the eastern states. 3
The discovery of gold in California in 1848 led to the de-
velopment of a new water doctrine in the West, the doctrine
of prior appropriation. The early miners who searched for the
precious metal developed a local custom recognizing the right
to divert water out of its natural channel for mining purposes,
as long as the diverted water was put to good use. The custom
was soon adopted in the agricultural and manufacturing in-
dustries, and was recognized by the courts and legislature.
The custom ripened into the appropriation doctrine, which
authorizes the diversion and use of water, if it is put to rea-
sonable and beneficial use. 4 Priority to the use of water de-
pends on the chronological sequence of competing appropria-
tions; to be "first in time" is to be "first in right.""5 This
doctrine is well suited to the unique exigencies of the arid
western states, where water is in short supply and its diver-
sion is vital to economic development.
California and several other states have dual systems of
water rights. Under the dual systems the riparian and appro-
priation doctrines exist side by side, providing two different
methods for acquisition of water rightss In other states, such
as Colorado, the appropriation doctrine has supplanted the ri-
parian doctrine and provides the exclusive basis for acquiring
a water right.37
Most western states, regardless of whether they have dual
water rights systems, have developed statutory systems gov-
erning appropriative water rights. 8 California's statutory sys-
WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 180-82 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as HUTCHINS, NINETEEN STATES].
33. See California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S.
142, 165 (1935); CLARK, supra note 1, at 29-36.
34. See generally California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.,
295 U.S. 142, 153-57 (1935); Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 456-61 (1878); HUTCHINS,
CALIFORNIA LAW, supra note 31, at 41-45; POMEROY, WATER RIGHTS chs. 2, 3 (1893);
WIEL, supra note 31, at 71-85.
35. See cases cited in note 34 supra.
36. See, e.g., In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System, 25 Cal. 3d 339,
347, 599 P.2d 656, 660-61, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350, 354 (1979), Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255,
10 p. 697 (1886). HUTCHINS, NINETEEN STATES, supra note 32, at 206; KINNEY, IRRIGA-
TION AND WATER RIGHTS 870-80 (2d ed. 1912) [hereinafter cited as KINNEY]; WIEL,
supra note 31, at 173-228.
37. See HUTCHINS, NINETEEN STATES, supra note 32, at 206; KINNEY, supra note
36, at 870-80; WIEL, supra note 31, at 173-228.
38. Of the eighteen western continental states, all but two have established such
statutory systems. The two exceptions are Colorado and Montana. Colorado provides
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tern is illustrative and, in fact, has provided the model for
many other states. In 1914, the California legislature adopted
a comprehensive statutory scheme which delegates the adjudi-
catory and regulatory functions over appropriative rights to a
water rights agency. 9 Water users who propose to appropriate
water must apply to the agency for an appropriative permit.'0
The agency, after a hearing, 41 may issue the permit if the pro-
posed use is consistent with "reasonable and beneficial use" of
water and in the "public interest."' 2 The agency may attach
conditions to the permit to ensure that this test is met.' Any
interested party may seek judicial review in a mandamus pro-
ceeding. The agency is authorized to issue a license to the
appropriator after he has built the works authorized by the
permit and has actually put the water to beneficial use.'5
After the adoption of the California water rights system
in 1914, a question arose concerning the interrelationship of
the riparian and appropriation doctrines. Suppose that a
downstream riparian user claims the right to use water which
is necessary to satisfy the needs of an upstream appropriator.
Does one right have supremacy over the other? Or, instead,
are the rights to be accommodated on the basis of the relative
importance of their uses? The questions were answered in
Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison Company.4' The
a system of statutory adjudication for the acquisition of appropriative rights, rather
than an administrative system. Montana provides for the acquisition of appropriative
rights by either statutory adjudication or by posting of notice and filing of records.
See HUTCHINS, NINETEEN STATES, supra note 32, at 302.
39. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 174, 175, 1200-1801 (West 1971). The agency, formerly
the State Water Rights Board, is now known as the State Water Resources Control
Board. See id. at 1250. See generally Temescal Water Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 44
Cal. 2d 90, 280 P.2d 11 (1955); State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Forni, 54 Cal.
App. 3d 743, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1976).
40. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1250, 1300, 1330 (West 1971).
41. A hearing is required and any interested party may attend and fully partici-
pate. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1253, 1330, 1350, 1357 (West 1971); 23 CAL. ADM. CODE §§
733(j), 735.
42. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1253, 1255, 1257 (West 1971).
43. CAL. WATER CODE § 1253 (West 1971). Under § 8 of the Reclamation Act of
1902, the agency is also authorized to impose conditions in permits issued to federal
agencies which operate federal reclamation projects, as long as the conditions are not
inconsistent with "congressional directives" established in the federal reclamation
laws. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978); 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383
(1970).
44. CAL. WATER CODE § 1360 (West 1971).
45. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1600-77 (West 1971).
46. 200 Cal. 81, 252 P. 607 (1927).
[Vol. 22
WATER RIGHTS
California Supreme Court held that a downstream riparian
has the right as against an upstream appropriator to com-
mand the entire flow of the stream to flood his pastureland,
regardless of whether the result is consistent with reasonable
water uses. Under the decision, a riparian right is superior to
an appropriative right regardless of the relative importance of
the uses.
The Herminghaus decision, however, was overturned by a
constitutional amendment enacted in 1928. . 7 The amendment
provides that California's water resources shall "be put to
beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable
.... '48 The amendment also provides "that the waste or un-
reasonable use or unreasonable method of use of water [shall]
be prevented, and that the conservation of such waters is to
be exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use
thereof in the interest of the people and for the public wel-
fare." 9 The first provision cited above establishes a principle
in favor of developing the state's water resources by providing
that the "beneficial use" of water must be maximized. The
second provision establishes a principle in favor of conserva-
tion by providing that water can be diverted and used only
where it is "reasonable and beneficial" to do so. Thus, the
constitutional amendment balances development and conser-
vation needs by encouraging water development under "rea-
sonable" circumstances.
The constitutional amendment effectively codified the
"reasonable and beneficial use" test, which is the essence of
the appropriation doctrine,"0 and made the test applicable to
47. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
48. Id.
49. Id. See generally Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 136-39,
429 P.2d 889, 891-94, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 379-82 (1967); Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2
Cal. 2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935); Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 22 P.2d
5 (1933).
50. The California legislature has adopted many guidelines for applying the
"reasonable and beneficial use" test. The state water rights agency, in granting appro-
priative rights, is required to weigh and consider various kinds of water uses, such as
domestic, irrigation, municipal, industrial, fish and wildlife, recreation, mining, and
power needs. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (West 1971). Under the California Envi-
ronmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21176 (West 1977), the agency
is required to consider various environmental needs, particularly the need for "clean
air and water" and other "qualitative factors as well as economic and technical fac-
tors." Id. at § 21001. The agency is also required to give a preference to counties and
watersheds which are the source of a particular water supply, as against other coun-
ties and watersheds which seek to import the water. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10505,
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all water rights in California-riparian, appropriative, or
other.' A riparian can no longer claim the right, as against an
appropriator, to use water simply because of the nature of his
right; he must now justify his right by showing that it meets
the reasonableness test. In this sense the constitutional
amendment amalgamated the riparian and appropriation doc-
trines by making them subject to a common standard of use.
As a result of the amendment, the riparian doctrine, although
a child of the common law, is now subject to the discipline of
a statutory master.
Even after the constitutional amendment, the courts have
continued to uphold certain historic priorities governing rights
established under the doctrines. For example, a riparian right
was, and apparently still is, superior to an appropriative right,
assuming that the rights are both reasonable and beneficial. 2
Also the appropriation doctrine, which affords a preference of
"first in right" to the use which is "first in time,"5' provides a
priority based on the sequence in which competing rights are
acquired, again assuming that the rights are reasonable and
beneficial. The constitutional amendment did not repeal these
various priorities. It substantially modified them, however, by
subjecting all rights to the standard of reasonableness. As a
result of the amendment the measure of a water right now
depends more on the nature of the use than on its theoretical
underpinnings or the time of its commencement.
The pivotal feature of the California water rights system
is the reasonableness test. This test provides the basis for a
water user to acquire the right to use water-whether the
right is based on riparian, appropriative or other princi-
ples-and the basis for competing users to challenge the right.
11460-11463 (West 1971). The agency must also give a preference to domestic uses
over irrigation uses. Id. at §§ 106, 1254. Finally, the agency, which is authorized to
adopt general plans establishing water quality standards for entire water basins, is
required to consider these plans in granting appropriative water rights. Id. at § 1258.
51. See In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System, 25 Cal. 3d 339, 599
P.2d 656, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1979); Tulare Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Dist., 3 Cal.
2d 489, 45 P.2d 972 (1935); Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 40 P.2d 486
(1935).
52. A "dormant" riparian right, i.e. one that is not being currently used, is not
lost, and in fact retains its priority as against an "active" appropriative right. See In
re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System, 25 Cal. 3d at 347, 599 P.2d at 660,
158 Cal. Rptr. at 354; Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935). A
fortiori, non-dormant riparian rights are superior to all appropriative rights.
53. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
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The question posed in this article, however, is whether this
test is the sole basis for measuring a water right in California.
Stated differently, assuming that a water right meets the rea-
sonableness test, is the right still subject to challenge under
public trust principles?
IV. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AS A BASIS FOR
CHALLENGING STATE-GRANTED WATER RIGHTS
The public trust doctrine is often advanced as a means
for protecting certain kinds of instream values, such as navi-
gation and fisheries, at the expense of out-of-stream values,
such as the needs of metropolitan areas which depend on
water diversions. 54 It is suggested, for example, that naviga-
tion and related needs are so important to the public welfare
that they should not be sacrificed for the economic gain of a
particular segment of society.5 Or, if such needs must be sac-
rificed, the sacrifice must take place at the legislative level,
not at the administrative level." It is argued that the public
values protected by the doctrine should be diminished, if at
all, only by action taken by legislators who are directly an-
swerable to the people.
There are several difficulties with this argument. As noted
earlier, the public trust doctrine, although limiting the extent
to which private claims can be asserted in navigable waters,
allows the state to choose between the competing values of
navigation and commerce, and does not compel the state to
make a particular choice.5 7 Under the Colberg line of cases,
the state has the right to develop or conserve its water supply.
The public trust doctrine is neutral on the choice that should
be made. In adopting its water rights system, California has
54. See Dunning, supra note 1; Johnson, supra note 1. This argument is also
advanced by the plaintiff in Nat'l Audubon Soc. v. Dep't of Water and Power of Los
Angeles, No. 639 (Alpine County Super. Ct., Cal.).
55. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
56. See Dunning, supra note 1, at 388-96. One commentator has suggested that,
under the public trust doctrine, consideration should be given to whether the govern-
mental action is undertaken at the legislative level rather than subordinate levels,
and whether the action has statewide rather than merely local significance. See Sax,
supra note 1, at 531. This view was expressed, however, only in the context of
whether the state should be deemed to have surrendered its sovereign interest in nav-
igable waters to private interests, not as a basis for limiting the state's water alloca-
tion authority under water rights laws.
57. See notes 25-29 supra and accompanying text.
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made a choice between navigation and commerce, and be-
tween development and conservation. Its choice, as reflected
in the 1928 constitutional amendment, requires that water be
developed to the extent that it is "reasonable and beneficial"
to do so. Development needs, therefore, must be balanced
against conservation needs on a case-by-case basis. The bal-
ance must initially be struck by the state's water rights
agency, at least to the extent appropriative rights are con-
cerned." In any event, the balance so struck is ultimately sub-
ject to judicial review. In the contest between navigation and
commerce, California has elected to protect neither interest at
the expense of the other; rather, it has elected to accommo-
date these interests by requiring that both interests be
weighed, along with all other relevant factors, in determining
the reasonableness of a proposed water diversion.
This accommodation perhaps can be more clearly seen in
a hypothetical example. Suppose that the state, during a
drought, attempts to divert or authorize the diversion of water
from a navigable waterway for the purpose of serving the
needs of a metropolitan community which lacks sufficient
water supplies to meet its current needs.5 9 Suppose also that
58. The state's water rights agency is responsible for granting appropriative
rights after the adoption of the statutory water rights system in 1914 and, thus, has
clear jurisdiction over post-1914 appropriative rights. Under § 275 of the California
Water Code, the agency also has the right to "take all appropriate proceedings or
actions before executive, legislative, or judicial agencies to prevent waste, unreasona-
ble use, unreasonable method of use, or unreasonable method of diversion of water."
CAL. WATER CODE § 275 (West 1971). It has been held that this provision authorizes
the agency to exercise administrative jurisdiction over rights other than post-1914
appropriative rights, such as riparian rights. See In re Waters of Long Valley Creek
Stream System, 25 Cal. 3d 339, 599 P.2d 656, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1979); State Water
Resources Control Bd. v. Forni, 54 Cal. App. 3d 743, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1976). The
agency has accordingly established administrative procedures governing claims chal-
lenging all water rights-whether riparian, appropriative, or other-that assertedly
result in waste or unreasonable use of water. See 23 CAL. ADM. CODE §§ 764.10-.12.
Although the agency, thus, has jurisdiction over all water rights, a claimant is not
required to initiate his claim before the agency at least where the agency did not
create the right in the first place, and where the claim does not challenge an agency-
created right. See Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 26 Cal.
3d 183, 605 P.2d 1, 161 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1980). Whether the agency must initially hear
claims challenging rights granted by the agency itself, is now before the court in Nat'l
Audubon Soc. v. Dep't of Water and Power of Los Angeles, No. 639 (Alpine County
Super. Ct., Cal.).
59. This situation actually occurred during the 1976-77 drought in California,
when the State Water Project diverted substantial amounts of water from the Sacra-
mento-San Joaquin Delta for use in Main County in northern California, under cir-
cumstances where Matin County users lacked alternative water supplies.
WATER RIGHTS
the diversion impairs instream values of the waterway, such as
navigation. Under California water rights law, the lawfulness
of the diversion depends on its reasonableness, which in turn
requires a balancing of all relevant factors. These factors in-
clude the purposes served by the community's water uses, the
purposes served by water uses that are in competition for the
water supply, the availability of alternative water supplies for
the community, and the effect of the diversions on navigation
and other instream values. The public trust doctrine, which
allows the state to protect either navigation or commerce,
does not indicate how this balance should be struck. Califor-
nia's water rights laws, however, provide a basis for striking
the balance. They vest jurisdiction in a state water rights
agency which has substantial expertise in the field of water
management and require the agency to apply the reasonable-
ness test in granting water rights. California's water rights
systems provide a basis for resolving the tension between nav-
igation and commerce which is beyond the scope of the public
trust doctrine.
State water rights systems, in general, provide a basis for
achieving economic development that might be denied under
a rigorous application of the public trust doctrine. California
and other western states suffer from largely arid conditions
which make it difficult to achieve economic growth by preser-
vation of water resources in their natural state. Economic de-
velopment can take place only by diverting water from natu-
ral channels to areas where it is needed for human or
economic needs. Indeed, the appropriation doctrine was devel-
oped uniquely in the west as a basis for authorizing such di-
versions, in recognition of the fact that such diversions are
often necessary to serve important public needs.
In California, for example, the federal government has
built a massive water delivery system, known as the Central
Valley Project, which distributes large volumes of waters from
rivers in northern California to agricultural and municipal
users in central California.6 The state has also built a collat-
eral water delivery system, known as the State Water Project,
which also distributes large volumes of waters from northern
60. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 651-53 (1978); Ivanhoe Irrig.
Dist. v. McCracken, 356 U.S. 275, 280-84 (1958); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock
Co., 339 U.S. 725, 727-35 (1950).
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California rivers to urban and agricultural users in the central
and southern parts of the state."1 These projects sell water to
municipal and agricultural water districts, which in turn sell
water to local users. The water is delivered to the districts by
pumping plants located at the southern end of the Sacra-
mento-San Joaquin Delta in northern California. The diver-
sion of water by these projects may have some adverse impact
on instream values in the Delta, such as navigation, which are
protected by the public trust doctrine. If the doctrine were
construed as protecting such instream values at all costs it
might be invoked as a basis for halting or impeding diversions
which are vital to economic growth. Under the California
water rights system, however, the project diversions are law-
ful, whatever their effect on instream values, because they re-
sult in the "reasonable and beneficial use" of water.6 2 They
provide irrigation water to agricultural users in the Central
Valley who produce food products which are shipped to na-
tional and international markets. They provide water for
drinking, sanitary and other purposes for people who dwell in
urban communities. They provide hydroelectric power which
eases our reliance on costly imported fossil fuels. The diver-
sions result in economic benefits which are ultimately benefi-
cial to California society.
Some may argue that the social costs of the project diver-
sions outweigh the social benefits; that it is better for the
water to remain in northern California rivers than to be used
by southern California urban and agricultural interests."' As
61. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 12934, 12937 (West 1971); CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RE-
SOURCES, BULLETIN 76, DELTA WATER FACILITIES at 30 (1978).
62. The state water rights agency has adopted a series of decisions, spanning
several years, granting appropriative water rights to the federal and state agencies
which operate the reclamation facilities, subject to conditions that are intended to
avoid or mitigate the harmful environmental impacts on Delta water quality. See De-
cision 1485, State Water Resources Control Bd. (August 1978); Water Quality Con-
trol Plan, State Water Resources Control Bd., I-1 through 1-11 (August 1978); Envi-
ronmental Impact Report for the Water Quality Control Plan and Water Rights
Decision, Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and Suisun March, State Water Resources
Control Bd., I-1 (August 1978). Several lawsuits have been filed against the state
agency by (1) Delta interests claiming that the agency's decision affords too little
protection of Delta interests, and (2) water districts that have contracted for water
deliveries from the projects, claiming that the agency's decision affords too much pro-
tection for Delta interests. See Delta Water Cases, Judicial Council Coordination
Proceeding No. 548 (County Super. Ct., San Francisco, Cal.).
63. See discussions of opposing views in Robie, Some Reflections on Environ-
mental Considerations in Water Rights Administration, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695, 714-18
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noted above, however, the balancing between such costs and
benefits is beyond the scope of the public trust doctrine. The
doctrine authorizes the state to make the choice between com-
peting instream and out-of-stream values, but does not com-
pel a particular choice. The proper balance between these val-
ues must be found in the political arena, not in common law
principles. In a democratic society, the people, through their
elected representatives, have the right to allocate their natural
resources in any manner which protects or promotes the per-
ceived public interest. One may hope that the people will be
respectful of environmental values, not just material ones.
This hope, however, cannot be enforced by the public trust
doctrine. The function of the doctrine, as explained more fully
below, is to ensure that the people retain a sovereign interest
in their water resources so that they can adapt their resources
to changing public needs. Assuming that the requisite sover-
eign interest is retained, the public trust doctrine does not
limit the state in allocating its resources in any particular
manner.
Nor is there a persuasive basis for arguing that impair-
ments of public trust values can only be made at the legisla-
tive level as opposed to the administrative level. In California,
as in most other western states, the legislature has delegated
its water rights functions to an administrative agency. 4 The
administrative agency, by exercising this function, has devel-
oped substantial expertise on the subject of water allocation
and use. Water allocation issues frequently involve compli-
cated and technical questions that are often more properly re-
solved at the administrative, rather than the legislative, level.
Indeed, water rights permits and licenses are not customarily
granted at the legislative level; they are customarily issued at
the administrative level pursuant to authority delegated
under the water rights system." In short, the water rights
(1973); Note, The Delta Water Rights Decision, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 733 (1973).
64. See notes 40-45 supra and accompanying text.
65. Although the federal Central Valley Project was authorized by Congress,
Congress did not grant water rights for the project. See Rivers and Harbors Act of
1937, 50 Stat. 844 (1937); Rivers and Harbors Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 1028 (1935). In-
stead, under § 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, it has required federal operating
agencies to acquire their water rights under state law. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383
(1958). Similarly, although the State Water Project was authorized under the Burns-
Porter Act, CAL. WATER CODE §§ 12930-44 (West 1971), the authorizing legislation
does not provide water rights for the project. The operating agency acquired its water
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function has been traditionally, and necessarily, exercised at
the administrative level. It is illogical and impractical to sug-
gest that impairment of trust values cannot occur on the ad-
ministrative level.
Finally, there is little basis in existing case authority for
the argument that the public trust doctrine provides a basis
for challenging a water right granted under state water rights
laws. No California appellate court has ever considered
whether or not the doctrine applies in this context." Signifi-
cantly, however, the appellate courts have traditionally ex-
amined issues concerning the right to divert and use water
under traditional water law principles. The riparian and ap-
propriation doctrines, for example, were developed by early
judicial decisions which collectively produced a highly-devel-
oped body of water law.07 After the adoption of the statutory
water rights system in 1914, the appellate courts analyzed
water rights issues within the framework of that system. 8 On
the other hand, as noted earlier, cases involving the public
trust doctrine have arisen in contexts unrelated to the right to
divert and use water." Indeed, the public trust doctrine has
never been applied in the water rights context in California.
This is not to suggest that old legal doctrines cannot be
adapted to modern public needs. There is little basis for mak-
ing this adjustment, however, where these modern needs are
satisfactorily met under existing water rights laws.
There is still a basis, however, for applying the public
trust doctrine in the water rights context. As noted earlier,
under the City of Berkeley line of cases, California holds its
rights from the state water rights agency.
66. The matter is now before a state court in Nat'l Audubon Soc. v. Dep't of
Water and Power of Los Angeles, No. 639 (Alpine County Super. Ct., Cal.).
67. Early cases which developed the riparian doctrine include Meridian v. San
Francisco, 13 Cal. 2d 424, 90 P.2d 537 (1939); Fall River Valley Irrig. Dist. v. Mt.
Shasta Power Corp., 202 Cal. 56, 259 P. 444 (1927); Alta Land & Water Co. v. Han-
cock, 85 Cal. 219, 24 P. 645 (1890); Lux j Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886).
Early cases which developed the appropriation doctrine prior to 1914 include
Inyo Consolidated Water Co. v. Jess, 161 Cal. 516, 119 P. 934 (1912); De Necochea v.
Curtis, 80 Cal. 397, 20 P. 563 (1889); Thompson v. Lee, 8 Cal. 275 (1857); Irwin v.
Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855).
68. See, e.g., Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 429 P.2d 889, 60
Cal. Rptr. 377 (1967); Temescal Water Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 44 Cal. 2d 90, 280
P.2d 1 (1955); Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 341, 40 P.2d 486 (1935); Chow v.
City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 22 P.2d 5 (1933).
69. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
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navigable waters in trust for certain public purposes and thus
has paramount control of such waters as against private pro-
prietary claims. As we shall now see, this trust responsibility
provides a basis for the state to retain continuing jurisdiction
over state-granted water rights so that water resources can be
adapted to changing public needs. Rather than constraining
the state to make a particular choice between navigation and
commerce, the doctrine provides that the state has a continu-
ing right to make that choice under changing conditions.
V. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AS A BASIS FOR RETENTION
OF STATE JURISDICTION OVER WATER RIGHTS
A fundamental principle of western water law is that
water rights are usufructuary rather than possessory.70 The
user does not own the water in the same sense that a person
may own land. Rather, he has a limited right to use water.
This use is subject to the paramount right of the public to use
or dedicate water for state purposes. This principle is derived
from both the Roman and English law, which recognized that
certain parts of man's surrounding environment, such as the
air that he breathes, the water which flows in streams and riv-
ers, and the sea, belong to the people in common and cannot
be fully owned by an individual. 71 This principle is reflected in
the fact that the states, in granting appropriative water rights,
issue only "permits" or "licenses" rather than "deeds" or
other documents which evidence "ownership" of property.7"
The usufructuary principle is expressed in various ways
in the water rights laws of the western states. Some states,
such as Colorado, constitutionally provide that water is the
"property" of the people of the state. 8 Others, like California,
70. See, e.g., United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 742-50
(1950); Seneca Consolidated Gold Mines v. Great W. Power Co., 209 Cal. 206, 287 P.
93 (1930); Gould v. Eaton, 117 Cal. 539, 49 P. 577 (1897); Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal.
249, 252 (1853); CLARK, supra note 1, at 349-51; KINNEY, supra note 36, at 769-73;
WIEL, supra note 31, at 13-21.
71. See WIEL, supra note 31, at 13-21. The first principle of the Institutes of the
Roman emperor Justinian provided that "by natural law these things are common to
all: air, running water, the sea, and as a consequence, the shore of the sea." Id.
72. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1375, 1600 (West 1971); IDAHO CODE § 42-220
(1977); HUTCHINS, NINETEEN STATES, supra note 32, at 302.
73. See, e.g., CoLo. CONST. art. XVI, § 5; WYo. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. Many
states, including California, have adopted the "property" terminology in statutory en-
actments. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971); IDAHO CODE § 42-101 (1977);
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constitutionally provide that the use of water is a "public use"
subject to state regulation and control.7 The former approach
is based on principles of property; the latter on principles of
sovereignty. One establishes a public dominium and the other
a public imperium. Whatever the reasoning, the result is the
same. If the people own the water, private interests presum-
ably cannot acquire an equivalent ownership interest, and pri-
vate rights are thus subordinate to public rights. If, instead,
the public has the right to control the use of water, private
rights are subject to the state's sovereign power. Either way,
the state has paramount control of its water resources over
private proprietary claims.
The states' control of water resources, however, is subject
to certain well-defined exceptions under federal law. For ex-
ample, state control is limited by the preemptive federal
power over navigation. It is also limited by the paramount
federal power to use waters, navigable or otherwise, on federal
lands.7 a This power is based on federal powers over property,
which suggests that the states do not have a pure "property"
interest in their waters. Furthermore, state control is limited
by federal common law principles found in the "equitable ap-
portionment" doctrine. This doctrine provides that the
United States Supreme Court, acting under its original juris-
diction, can apportion interstate waters between two or more
states on the basis of equitable needs within each of the
states. 7 These limitations suggest that the states do not truly
own their water in any classical sense, and that their control
of water is based on principles of sovereignty rather than
property. The trust, in the final analysis, is more an attribute
of the state's sovereign power over its citizens than an inci-
dent of its dominium.
S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 46-1-4 (1967); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7467 (Vernon
1954). Many states provide that water "belongs to" the people of the state. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 45-101A (1956); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01 (1960); OR. REV.
STAT. § 537.110 (1979).
74. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 5; WASH. CONST.
art. XXI, § 1.
75. See California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S.
142, 159 (1935); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
76. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128, 138-42 (1976); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
77. ' See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325




Whatever its conceptual source, the usufructuary princi-
ple is simply an expression of the state's trust responsibilities
to its citizens in the water rights context. This trust responsi-
bility, as set forth in the City of Berkeley line of cases, pro-
vides that the state retains continuing jurisdiction over navi-
gable waters for the protection of certain public uses. The
usufructuary principle extends that rule to the water rights
context. So viewed, the public trust doctrine does more than
simply protect certain historic instream values, such as navi-
gation. It enables the state to allocate, and if necessary reallo-
cate, its water supply for the protection of important public
interests. The usufructuary principle is both an outgrowth
and an extension of the public trust doctrine.
If this thesis is correct, it follows that the public trust
doctrine applies to non-navigable waters in some instances.
For example, western water laws, whether adopting the "prop-
erty" or "public use" approach for establishing public control
of waters, make no distinction between navigable and non-
navigable waters.7 8 Nor is such a distinction found in western
water laws which establish appropriative water rights sys-
tems.79 Therefore, the usufructuary principle applies both to
navigable and non-navigable waters. Indeed, the same result
may follow with respect to the public trust doctrine in its
traditional context. Certain public trust values, for example
fisheries, would seem protectible regardless of the navigability
of the waters on which the values depend. In California, for
instance, the state has jurisdiction over fisheries found in all
waters, whether navigable or not.80 Therefore, it may be im-
proper to say that the pu1jic trust doctrine applies only to
navigable waters. It may be more accurate to say that the doc-
trine protects certain interests, such as navigation, in naviga-
ble waters, and certain other interests, such as water alloca-
tions and fisheries, in all waters, whether navigable or not.
At first blush, the usufructuary principle is directed to-
wards the question of whether or not the state can take water
which is necessary to satisfy private rights and, thereby, make
the water available for other uses. There would seem to be no
78. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5, 6; N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2; CAL.
WATER CODE §§ 1200-1202 (West 1971); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.120 (1969 Supp.); WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 90.03.010, 90.44.020-.030.
79. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1201, 1202 (West 1971).
80. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 5500-5512, 7145, 8603 (West 1958).
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doubt as to the state's ability to take the water pursuant to its
powers of eminent domain, provided the state compensates
the holder of the rights.81 Because of the high value of water
in the western states, however, it is often prohibitive for the
state to pay for water under its condemnation powers. The
usufructuary principle is significant, in a practical sense, to
determine whether the state can take the water without the
payment of compensation. The question is not whether the
state has the right to take the water, but whether it can exer-
cise this right without payment of compensation.
The implications of the usufructuary principle, in terms
of whether the state can take the water without payment of
compensation, have not been fully explored by the courts. The
basis of the principle is strongest where the state asserts con-
tinuing jurisdiction over water rights in order to protect tradi-
tional public uses in navigable waters, such as navigation it-
self. It is well established that the federal navigation power
authorizes the federal government to take privately-held
water rights without payment of compensation in order to
protect the navigability of navigable waters.82 Since, under the
public trust, the state has analogous control of its navigable
waters, it would seem that the state has continuing jurisdic-
tion over water rights in order to protect navigation. Under
this analysis, the state would not need to pay compensation
for the loss of such rights.
A more difficult question arises, however, where the state
exercises continuing jurisdiction over water rights to protect
interests which are unrelated to navigation. Suppose that the
state attempts to modify an apprepriative water right in order
81. California's eminent domain power is codified in both constitutional and
statutory law. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19; CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 1230.010-1268.720
(West 1972). Under this power, privately-held water rights can apparently be taken
by the payment of compensation. Cf. City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 10 Cal. App. 2d
460, 52 P.2d 585 (1935). The federal courts have held that the federal government can
take privately-held water rights for non-navigation purposes by the payment of com-
pensation. See note 82 infra and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); United
States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); Morreale, Federal Power in
Western Waters: The Navigation Rule and the Rule of No Compensation, 3 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 1, 64 (1963). If the water is taken for reclamation or other non-naviga-
tion purposes, however, the holder of the private right can sue the federal govern-
ment under the Tucker Act for the payment of damages. See City of Fresno v. Cali-




to make water available for competing users because the state
believes the reallocation is necessary for the public interest.
Does the state have the right to alter the water right without
the payment of compensation? Or, does the holder of the
right have a vested interest that prohibits the state from act-
ing for such non-navigation purposes?
It would seem that if the state has continuing jurisdiction
over water rights for the protection of navigation, the state
also retains continuing jurisdiction where other important in-
terests are at stake. Because of the scarcity of the water sup-
ply in the arid western states, the allocation of water has, it
would seem, no less an effect on the public interest than the
protection of navigation. In the West, water is insufficient to
supply the many demands upon it. Therefore, the state, in al-
locating water for specific uses, necessarily limits the availa-
bility of water for other kinds of uses. By authorizing water
diversions for agricultural uses in one area, for example, the
state may reduce the availability of water for competing agri-
cultural uses in other areas, or for urban communities which
need water for drinking and sanitary purposes, or for hydro-
electric power production. The state, in granting water rights,
makes decisions which cumulatively, if not individually, strike
a balance between different kinds of economic interests and
between economic and environmental interests. The balance
ultimately determines the kind of society in which we live.
One court declared several years ago, in hyperbole which is
not without justification, that because of the scarcity of Cali-
fornia's water resources "its waters are the very life blood of
its existence. ' '88
The above considerations provide ample authority for the
state to develop a water rights system governing the acquisi-
tion of a water right in the first instance; no serious argument
can be made that the state lacks such authority. The same
considerations also appear to provide authority for the state
to retain continuing jurisdiction over such rights, a proposi-
tion that is less widely accepted. Water uses and needs are
dynamic rather than static, particularly in the arid western
states. These uses and needs change with the alteration of
many factors, such as demography, hydrology, climate and
economics. They also change with the alteration of man's
83. Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 702, 22 P.2d 5, 16-17 (1933).
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subjective perceptions concerning the proper balance between
his material needs and the needs of his surrounding
environment.84
For example, there was a need to allocate substantial
amounts of water to the mining industry in the last century
because mining was the West's most important industry at
that time. Today, there is a need to allocate substantial
amounts of water to agricultural use because agriculture is
now the West's most important industry. Perhaps in the fu-
ture there will be a need to allocate substantially greater
amounts of water to hydroelectric power production. Also,
with our increasing environmental awareness, there is a grow-
ing recognition of the need to limit water diversions for con-
sumptive uses so that some water resources can be preserved
in their natural state as part of our environmental heritage.
The usufructuary principle provides a basis for the people,
through their elected representatives, to adapt their water re-
sources to public needs which change with the inevitable
march of human history. This result follows whether water is
"property" which belongs to the people or whether its use is a
"public use" which is subject to paramount public control.
The usufructuary principle provides a warning to holders
of water rights that their rights are subject to modification as
necessary to achieve more important social goals. If the result
were otherwise, the allocation of water in the West would pri-
marily depend on historical patterns of use rather than mod-
ern public needs. This consequence would unduly restrict the
state's authority to allocate waters in a manner which pro-
vides the greatest number of public benefits, which is one of
the most fundamental attributes of sovereign power. The usu-
fructuary principle apparently provides a basis for the state to
retain continuing jurisdiction over water rights, even after the
rights have been granted.
The 1928 constitutional amendment, which establishes
the reasonableness test as the basis for measuring a water
84. Recent legislation adopted both at the federal and state levels articulates
the need for governmental agencies to protect environmental values in the process of
carrying out their statutorily-mandated duties. See National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4334 (1970); National Environmental Quality Improve-
ment Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4371-4373 (1970); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-




right in California, also provides a basis for the state to retain
jurisdiction over water rights. The California courts have held
that the reasonableness of a water use varies from time to
time and cannot be measured at any fixed point in time.865 The
implication of the decisions is that the reasonableness test
must be applied on a continuing basis, not simply at the fixed
point in time when the right was granted. As noted above,
mining uses may have been reasonable during the last century
and agricultural uses reasonable during the present one. No
one can fully predict, of course, the kinds of uses that may be
most reasonable during the next century. Thus, the reasona-
bleness test provides another basis, in addition to the usufruc-
tuary principle, for retention of state jurisdiction over water
rights.
The reasonableness test, as established under the 1928
constitutional amendment, does more than simply reaffirm
the usufructuary principle. It implements the power reserved
to the states under that principle. The usufructuary principle
establishes that the state has continuing jurisdiction over
water rights, consistent with public trust principles espoused
in the City of Berkeley line of cases. Using its continuing ju-
risdiction, California has adopted a reasonableness test as the
basis for measuring the continuing existence of a water right.
The usufructuary principle enables the state to continue mak-
ing the choice among competing water uses, and the reasona-
bleness test provides the substantive criteria for making the
choice.
The recent trend in California judicial decisions has been
to interpret the reasonableness test as a basis for retention of
broad state jurisdiction over water rights. For instance, the
California Supreme Court recently ruled that, under the rea-
sonableness test, riparian rights which are "dormant," i.e., not
currently being exercised, can be quantified and prioritized by
the state water rights agency. 6 This indicates that such rights
cannot, like a sleeping dog in the manger, arise from their
slumber to attack appropriative rights that have been exer-
cised on the assumption that sufficient water was available for
the appropriative right. In another recent decision, the Cali-
85. See, e.g., Prather v. Hoberg, 24 Cal. 2d 549, 560, 150 P.2d 405, 411 (1944);
Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 368, 40 P.2d 486, 491-92 (1935).
86. In Re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System, 25 Cal. 3d 339, 599 P.2d
656, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1979).
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fornia Supreme Court ruled that prescriptive rights, rights
that have been exercised by adverse possession, are subject to
the authority of the state water rights agency.' 7 In still an-
other case, a California appellate court recently held, in an
action brought by the state water rights agency, that a ripar-
ian user, using water for frost protection purposes, can be re-
quired to limit his water uses to make water available for
more compelling appropriative uses.88 These decisions suggest
that, under the reasonableness test, the rights of a water user
are subject to the state's paramount right to use water for
other, more compelling uses which are in the public interest.
A similar approach has been taken by the United States
Supreme Court in cases involving the apportionment of inter-
state waters between different states. In apportioning such
waters, the Court has made it clear that "equitable" consider-
ations ultimately govern. 9 Moreover, as these equitable con-
siderations change from time to time, the Court can change its
apportionments to reflect the changed circumstances." His-
toric water rights priorities, such as the principle of "first in
time, first in right," are "guiding principles," which must yield
to more compelling equitable factors, such as the extent to
which junior water uses sustain the economy of an entire re-
gion.91 In short, the Court appears to have adopted a reasona-
bleness test in apportioning waters among different states and
has retained jurisdiction to alter the apportionments on the
basis of changed circumstances. The water rights of the states,
acting in a parens patriae capacity on behalf of private users,
are thus subject to continuing equitable factors. It follows that
the rights of individual users within each of the states are also
subject to the same factors.
The importance of the reasonableness test, as a means to
protect the public interest, is illustrated by the recent 1976-77
drought in California. During that period, a residential devel-
oper in southern California proposed to use large amounts of
water to fill Lake Mission Viejo, a lake that served only the
87. People v. Shirokow, 26 Cal. 3d 301, 605 P.2d 859, 162 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1980).
88. State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Forni, 54 Cal. App. 3d 743, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 851 (1976).
89. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 607-11, 616-27 (1945); Wyoming v.
Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).




recreational needs of a surrounding residential development.
The developer obtained much of its water from a large whole-
saler which, in turn, obtained much of its water from northern
California through the State Water Project. At a time when
people in northern California lacked sufficient water for their
own needs, embarking on stringent rationing programs, a de-
veloper in southern California obtained large quantities of
water from northern California to provide recreation for a
small number of people. The state prepared to take legal ac-
tion to halt the developer's practice on grounds that it re-
sulted in "unreasonable" water uses. The developer halted his
practice before the action was filed.9 2 The legal question none-
theless remains: Does the usufructuary principle authorize the
state to revoke or modify a water right under circumstances
which are vastly changed from the time that the right was
granted? The usufructuary principle clearly enables the state
to take action under such circumstances. This principle is an
affirmation of the state's sovereign power over its natural re-
sources, particularly as those resources are necessary to serve
important public needs. The principle establishes a basis for
the state to retain continuing jurisdiction over water rights for
the protection of many public needs, not just navigation and
other instream values.
On the other side of the coin, there is a need to provide
substantial certainty and predictability with respect to private
water rights so that water users can rely upon existing water
supplies. This interest cannot be achieved if a state, in deter-
mining the allocations necessary to satisfy modern public
needs, pays little heed to historical patterns of use. There will
be sufficient certainty only if requisite consideration is given
to the water rights holder's past reliance and present depen-
dence on his water right. In allocating water among competing
needs, the state must consider all factors related to the public
interest. These factors properly include the extent to which a
water rights holder has built diversion and distribution facili-
ties in reliance on his right and the extent to which he and his
customers now necessarily depend on the right in light of
whether alternative water supplies are available. The greater
92. See Nat'l Audubon Soc. v. Dept. of Water and Power of Los Angeles, No.
639 (Alpine County Super. Ct., Cal.), Affidavit of Willian R. Atwater, filed in support
of California's Motion for Summary Judgment at 5-6.
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the reliance and dependence on a water right, the more rea-
sonable its continued existence.
It was noted earlier that the significance of the historic
priority principle of the appropriation doctrine-the principle
of "first in time, first in right"-has diminished in light of the
constitutional adoption of the reasonableness test." This pri-
ority nonetheless establishes a presumptive validity of prior or
existing rights as against newly-asserted uses. As a result of
this presumption, water should not be reallocated from ex-
isting uses to new uses unless it is shown, by persuasive evi-
dence, that the existing uses are no longer reasonable in light
of all relevant circumstances. The fact that a water user has a
longstanding water right is an important, but not determina-
tive, factor in determining whether the right should continue
to exist. This result accommodates the need to provide for
stability in water rights systems with the need to protect im-
portant public needs that can only be served by new water
supplies.
In summary, the usufructuary principle, on which the
reasonableness test is based, is a deeply ingrained principle of
Western water law. Although the implications of the principle
have never been fully spelled out, it apparently provides a ba-
sis for the state to exercise continuing jurisdiction over water
rights for the purpose of adapting a limited resource to chang-
ing public needs. Historical patterns of use, although highly
relevant in determining modern public needs, cannot bind the
state's exercise of sovereign power to meet these needs.
Whether water is public "property" or its use a "public use,"
the state has an inherent right to utilize its water resources
for protection of legitimate social interests as those interests
change from one generation to the next.
VI. CONCLUSION
The public trust doctrine has relevance in the water
rights context, but not in the manner currently suggested by
some environmental advocates. The trust provides a means
for the state to ensure that water resources are put to the best
possible use under changing circumstances. It does not, how-
ever, require that the state put such resources to a particular
93. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
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use. It provides a basis for the state to retain sovereign control
of waterways, but does not compel the state to exercise this
power in a particular manner. Choices among competing
water needs can only be addressed under state water rights
laws which have been created for that specific purpose. The
public trust is substantively neutral on the kinds of choices
which the state should make. Therefore, environmentalists
and others who wish to influence the choice must look to con-
ventional water rights laws, not to the public trust. This is so,
not because the trust has never been used in this situation,
but because it does not apply. Those who attempt to make it
apply misconceive the nature of the trust and have chosen the
wrong remedy to advance their cause.

